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In 1997, Diane Blood famously won a court case allowing her to export the 
sperm of her dead husband from England to Belgium with the goal of conceiving a 
child with the assistance of medical technology.
1
 The pictures of a smiling Ms. 
Blood exiting the British Court after her initial victorious ruling, and later on, her 
pictures with her first, and then second, son have captured much international 
attention. Since then, more and more children have been posthumously conceived, 
and the phenomenon has received growing attention. Not only does posthumous 
conception capture the social imagination in its construction of parenthood and 
families, but it also raises new legal quandaries. Questions about the scope of 
reproductive freedom, the limits of consent, and the value of genetic material as 
property are all pertinent. As adults make reproductive choices, physicians provide 
the needed medical services, and courts adjudicate related dilemmas, debates over 
posthumous conception have centered on the rights and interests of the adults at 
stake.  
                                                 
 I want to thank Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for organizing and hosting the 
symposium, especially Professor Browne C. Lewis, Sasha M. Swoveland (Senior Editor) and 
Trent Stechschulte (Editor-in-Chief) as well as the Publication Editors, Ami Imbrogno and 
Katharine Green, for their assistance with this publication. 
 
 1 R. v Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA 
(Civ) 4003, [70], [1997] 2 WLR 806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.). In this case, a first sample of sperm was 
extracted by electro-ejaculation when the husband was in coma; a second sample was 
extracted shortly before the husband was certified clinically death. The samples were kept by 
the Infertility Research Trust; however, it refused to release the sperm to Ms. Blood. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not approve the release on the grounds 
that the requirements of “written and effective consent of a man” were not met. Id. at [2]–[3], 
[5]. 
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Significantly less attention has been given to the resulting children. Certainly, 
this neglect may be at least partially attributed to the focus on the moral and legal 
status of embryos or even pre-embryonic entities. But as children are the end goal of 
the procedure, attention to their interests and rights is cardinal. Are posthumously 
conceived children harmed by being born? What rights do posthumously conceived 
children have—or should they have? How can their interests be protected? And 
importantly, how do children conceptualize the related rights and interests for 
themselves?  
This essay considers posthumous conception from an international and child-
centered approach. After a sketch in Part I of the phenomenon of posthumous 
conception and the complexities it evokes, Part II examines the types of issues 
arising in court cases concerning posthumous conception. Part III considers how 
courts in their rulings have addressed the welfare and best interests of posthumously 
conceived children and analyzes the scope and meaning of relevant decisions. Part 
IV looks into children’s rights or interests raised in those judicial decisions: parental 
acknowledgement, family structures, identity harm, and inheritance and social 
benefits. This part draws on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
2
 a 
prime instrument to advance children’s rights on the international level, 
incorporating as much as possible the perspectives of children. I argue that the 
discourse must include concern for the rights and interests of posthumously 
conceived children and that a new special category of children who are “outcast” 
cannot stand the test of equality and non-discrimination, nor of the entrenched 
principles of child welfare and best interests. Moreover, I suggest that attending to 
children’s perspectives may illuminate the gaps in the current discourse and what 
needs to be addressed. Finally, Part V draws some conclusions and calls for a more 
relational approach to ensure that posthumously conceived children do not pay the 
price of their parents’ decisions and that their welfare and best interests are upheld. 
I.  THE PHENOMENON OF POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 
Although in most societies procreation holds a central place in one’s community 
and one’s own social fabric, no other medical development has raised as many 
opposing voices as assisted reproductive technologies. The phenomenon of 
posthumous conception is no different; on the contrary, it both revisits and extends 
controversies about the scope of reproductive freedom, the family, and medical 
technologies. In explaining the excitement—and criticism—that arose, this Part 
highlights why this phenomenon has captured national and international attention 
and pinpoints the ethical and legal dilemmas that ensue.  
The first reason for the growing interest in posthumous conception is the 
sensational nature of the issue. While examples of children born after the death of 
their fathers (“posthumous birth”) can be found in earliest history,
3
 the phenomenon 
of posthumous conception, in which medical technologies are used to achieve a 
pregnancy, is relatively new. Although sperm freezing became possible in 1949, 
                                                 
 2 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167, (Sept. 2, 1990). 
 3 Michael R. Soules, Commentary: Posthumous Harvesting of Gametes – A Physician’s 
Perspective, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362, 362 (1999). 
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reports suggest that the first posthumous conception occurred in 1977,
4
 the first 
posthumous sperm retrieval was in 1980,
5
 and the first child born after posthumous 
sperm retrieval was Liam, the Blood’s child, in 1998.
6
 Egg retrieval and preservation 
is even more recent.
7
 Because egg harvesting from a live woman is significantly 
more medically complicated than retrieving sperm (even from a dead man),
8
 it 
became possible only in the late 1970s with the development of in-vitro-fertilization 
(IVF): the first reported case of birth after egg freeze was in 1986.
9
 Further, although 
harvesting of female ova or tissue is now possible, using eggs that were extracted 
posthumously or from a dying woman (without her full cooperation) is ever more 
complex. Gestation requires a surrogate mother. Yet this is fraught with social and 
ethical disagreements, and legally, many countries prohibit the practice of 
surrogacy.
10
 Consequently, there are no published reports of children born as a result 
of these recent techniques,
11
 and the court only approved—for the first and possibly 
only time—a family’s request to extract eggs from a woman who was declared brain 
                                                 
 4 Alberta Law Reform Inst., Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children: Report 
for Discussion, ALRI PUBLICATIONS, 1, 3, 5 (Jan. 2012), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/
alri/docs/rfd023.pdf. 
 5 Cappy M. Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 34 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 512, 512 (1980). 
 6 Jason Pobjoy, Medically Mediated Reproduction: Posthumous Conception and the Best 
Interests of the Child, 15 J.L. & MED. 450, 452 (2007). 
 7 See Jason D. Hans, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Harvesting and Reproduction, 32 
DEATH STUD. 837, 838–39 (2008).  
 8 Egg retrieval requires one-to-two weeks of hormonal ovarian stimulation before 
harvesting of eggs can take place. Id. at 838. 
 9 Christopher Chen, Pregnancy After Human Oocyte Cryopreservation, 327 THE LANCET 
884, 884–86 (1986).The second reported case of birth after egg freeze was in 1987. J.F.H.M. 
Van Uem et al., Birth After Cryopreservation of Unfertilized Oocytes, 329 LANCET 752, 752–
53 (1987).  
 10 Italy, for instance, prohibits both altruistic and commercial surrogacy. Germany, France, 
various states in the U.S., Switzerland, Greece, Spain, Norway, New Zealand, and several 
Australian states prohibit commercial surrogacy as well, though New Zealand allows altruistic 
surrogacy if an ethics committee approves the procedure in advance. John A. Robertson, 
Protecting Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy, 19 HUM. REPROD. 
1693, 1693 (2004); Usha R. Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International 
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 24–26 (2008). In 
Israel, because of various religious limitations, only full surrogacy is allowed (i.e., the 
surrogate is not genetically linked to the child), and the regulations also require that the 
surrogate and the intended mother belong to the same religion. A new law regulating ova 
donations in Israel entered into force in March 2011 allowing Israeli women between the ages 
of twenty and thirty-five to donate ova in exchange for some payment. Dan Even, Knesset 
Approves Revolutionary Law Allowing Domestic Ova Donations, HAARETZ (Isr.), June 9, 
2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/knesset-approves-revolutionary-law-
allowing-domestic-ova-donations-1.295004. The egg donation must be anonymous and to 
ensure the maternal religious linage the donor‘s and the recipient‘s religion must be matched. 
Id. Also, a baby born to a Jewish family from a non-Jewish donor will have to undergo 
conversion. Id. 
 11 Hans, supra note 7, at 839. 
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dead as recently as 2011.
12
 Thus, posthumous conception using gametes extracted 
during life for reproduction after the man or woman died—or following the retrieval 
of sperm or especially egg from the dead—represents the most recent form of the 
“new family.” 
Second, posthumous conception marks another shift in the social construction of 
kinship. Certainly, the scientific revolution in fertility treatments had already 
shattered the traditional conceptualization of the family as a union between a man 
and a woman. New technologies like hormone treatment, IVF, and gamete donation 
gave a couple the chance of overcoming infertility. They also enabled single women, 
gay couples, and transgender individuals to become biological parents. Indeed, such 
non-traditional families turned into visible consumers in the market for assisted 
reproductive technologies.
13
 Nonetheless, the phenomenon of posthumous 
conception is unique among those new technologies. It does suggest some sort of 
continuation of the traditional family structure of a husband and wife (and 
increasingly, also of other unmarried heterosexual couples) even if one party to the 
relationship is no longer alive.
14
 But, while the law commonly treats children born 
within a certain accepted time period after the father’s death (generally, around three 
hundred days from the father’s death) as any other child who is born “into the 
marriage,”
15
 posthumous conception can extend the timeframe for a “marital child” 
for a longer period, and potentially, indefinitely.
16
  
                                                 
 12 David Regev, Woman’s Dream to Have a Child Fulfilled After Death, YNETNEWS.COM 
(June 14, 2011), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4081456,00.html; Mikaela 
Conley, Harvesting Dead Girl’s Eggs Raises Ethical Issues, CBS NEWS (August 11, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20091343-10391704.html.Whether an adolescent 
can consent to parent a child after his or her death (and if so, from what age) is another 
interesting question concerning children’s rights. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 13 Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible 
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 31–33 (2008); June Carbone, If I Say “Yes” 
to Regulation Today, Will You Still Respect Me in the Morning?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1747, 1763–64 (2008); Kathryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for 
Retrieving and Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 293–
94 (2006); Paul Lauritzen, What Price Parenthood?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 38 (1990). 
Some scholars made a distinction between medical infertility and so-called “social infertility.” 
The latter refers especially to single mothers or same-sex couples who cannot achieve 
pregnancy due to a lack of a partner or of interest in having a sexual relationship with another 
person from the opposite sex. Daar, supra at 31–32. See also Julien S. Murphy, Should 
Lesbians Count as Infertile Couples? Antilesbian Discrimination in Assisted Reproduction, in 
EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST ADVANCES 103, 103 (Anne Donchin & Laura M. 
Purdy eds., 1999). 
 14 Bob Simpson, Making ‘Bad’ Deaths ‘Good’: the Kinship Consequences of Posthumous 
Conception, 7 ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 1, 3 (2001). 
 15 BROWNE C. LEWIS, PAPA’S BABY: PATERNITY AND ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 113–14 
(2012). 
 16 Sperm Cryopreservation allows for sperms to remain viable for a long period of time. 
While the maximum period of time for such preservation is unknown, estimates range from 
twelve years to centuries. Joshua Greenfield, Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago? 
Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 277, 280–81 (2006). Embryo freezing is another 
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Simultaneously, posthumous conception opens the door for significantly more 
complex familial relationships. So far, the most common scenario is that the life 
partner of the deceased, generally his widow or girlfriend, seeks to use his frozen 
gametes herself, intending to fertilize the egg and carry the pregnancy to term. 
Increasingly, however, other scenarios are arising.
17
 For instance, a surviving 
husband who has possession of frozen embryos he had created with his now 
deceased wife can contract with a surrogate mother to carry the pregnancy to term 
(this happened recently in Israel
18
); he might just as well decide to remarry and 
request that the new wife be implanted with the embryos created with the previous 
wife. Parents of a deceased or dying person can request that doctors harvest the 
gametes of their loved ones for donation
19
 or to be used along with gamete donation 
or surrogacy to create a grandchild.
20
 Third parties may further gain possession of 
gametes or frozen embryos when either one, or both, genetic parents die, and these 
new owners could either carry the pregnancy or contract with a surrogate to undergo 
a pregnancy. In cases of gamete donation, a third party might purchase gametes if 
fertility clinics do not discard them after the donor’s death. Moreover, given the rise 
in legal recognition of same-sex couples as family units, the surviving partner of a 
same-sex couple may soon turn to posthumous conception as well.
21
 For a gay man, 
that would mean using the sperm of the deceased partner and would require a 
                                                                                                                   
common practice that allows extending viability of gamete for long periods. Given that it 
requires a male partner, it is limited in its support for single women who want to extend their 
reproductive period. Cryopreservation is increasingly used also for eggs and ovarian tissues. 
Only limited data exists regarding the effect of duration of egg and ovarian preservation on the 
rates of viability and pregnancy; one study showed that, in terms of survival, fertilization, 
embryo quality, etc., the results after forty-eight months storage are comparable to shorter 
periods of storage. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Mature Oocyte Cryopreservation: A 
Guideline, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 37, 40 (2013). Note that contrary to some states in the 
United States (such as New York), where the laws or professional guidelines do not prescribe 
maximum storage time on gamete and embryo cryopreservation, some countries require that 
such storage does not exceed certain time periods as provided by law (in the United Kingdom, 
for instance, it stands on ten years). As technologies further develop, however, the time 
limitation is likely to increase. Surrogacy can further extend the period of reproduction: it 
removes the barrier of women’s infertility due to age.  
 17 Gary S. Nakhuda, Posthumous Assisted Reproduction, 28 SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 
329, 329–31 (2010). 
 18 Dan Even, Israeli Woman Becomes Mother Two Years After Dying of Cancer, HAARETZ 
(Isr.), June 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-woman-becomes-
mother-two-years-after-dying-of-cancer-1.367523. 
 19 This was one of the intentions of the parents of the deceased 17-year-old girl in the case 
of Chen Ayash. Nitzi Yakov, Court Permits Harvest of Dead Girl’s Eggs, Father Decides He 
Does Not Want to Use Them, ISRAELHAYOM.COM (August 8, 2011), http://www.israelhayom.
com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=632. However, according to media reports the deceased 
father ultimately was uncomfortable with the possibility of donating her eggs to an infertile 
woman and the family decided to destroy the eggs. Id.   
 20 Michael Leidig, Russian Woman May Lose Grandson Conceived from Dead Son’s 
Frozen Sperm, 332 BMJ 627, 627 (2006). 
 21 Such an option is also explicitly endorsed by some laws (e.g. in Victoria, Australia and 
in the United Kingdom). See infra note 51; infra Part II. 
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surrogate and an egg donor to bear a child who is not genetically related to him. In 
the case of a lesbian woman, she may seek to take an embryo from her deceased 
partner’s eggs and a sperm donor (whether created while she was alive or after her 
death) and have it transferred to her own uterus, to that of a surrogate, or to that of a 
new partner. In each of these cases, it is unclear who should be registered as the 
father or mother on the child’s birth certificate or acknowledged as the child’s 
parent. In short, medical advances in posthumous conception mean that questions 
about kinship, familial relationships, and parentage have become more complicated, 
and are likely to become even more so.  
Finally, posthumous conception creates a new front in reproductive choice. 
While parental reproductive freedom is often viewed as a basic right,
22
 its 
entanglement with medical technologies that enable people to materialize this right 
beyond the “natural” has raised acrimonious debates.
23
 Supporters of reproductive 
freedom have argued that (considering the financial, social, emotional, and other 
burdens associated with raising a child) parental decisions about the sort of 
commitment they want and can undertake should be respected.
24
 Accordingly, the 
right to reproductive freedom should include the choice of how to procreate and 
under what circumstances to do so.
25
 Critics, conversely, have suggested that 
                                                 
 22 International human rights treaties include reference to the right to found a family. See 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at 
16 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6316, at 23 (Dec. 16, 1966); Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 67 B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, at 23 (Jan. 24, 2007); Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/34/46, at 23 (Dec. 18, 1979). Notwithstanding the internationally recognized 
right to found a family, both the right to reproduce and the right not to reproduce are fraught 
with controversies. Scholarly work has highlighted racial, ethnic, cultural, and economic 
discrimination; other controversies include the imposed sterilization throughout history of 
women deemed unsuitable for parenthood (because of their skin color, disability, etc.) and the 
impact of lack of access to other social and health benefits on the ability to exercise the right 
to found a family. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of 
Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 459–500 (2007–2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, The 
Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 209–73 (1995); Hawley Fogg-Davis, Navigating Race in 
the Market for Human Gametes, 31 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13–21 (2001); see also, Maya 
Sabatello, Who’s Got Parental Rights? The Intersection Between Infertility, Reproductive 
Technologies, and Disability Rights Law, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 227, 227–59 (2010). 
 23 The right “[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications” may further 
strengthen an argument for reproductive freedom through assisted reproductive technologies. 
This right is stipulated in Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
& Cultural Rights. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 3, 1976). See also, Maya Sabatello, Advancing Transgender’s 
Family Rights through Science – A Proposal for An Alternative Framework, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 
43, 43–75 (2011). 
 24 John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B. U. L. REV. 
421, 421–82 (1996); Richard J. Hull, Cheap Listening?—Reflections on the Concept of 
Wrongful Disability, 20 BIOETHICS 55, 55–63 (2006). 
 25 John A. Robertson et al., Conception to Obtain Hematopoietic Stem Cells, 32 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 34, 34–40 (2002); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, 
and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1490–1513 (2007-
2008). 
2014] AN INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 35 
 
 
procreation through the use of assisted reproductive technologies, especially by 
untraditional families—single mothers and same sex couples—are a form of child 
abuse.
26
 They have emphasized that preserving the institution of parenthood “the 
way we know it” is the only way to meet each child’s “need” for a mother and a 
father.
27
 Opponents of posthumous conception in particular contend that a resulting 
child may be a “substitute” for the lost spouse, and that the grieving process of the 
surviving spouse constitutes a psychological instability that would impair the child’s 
future welfare.
28
 They are therefore opposed to the extension of the fundamental 
right to procreate after death.
29
 
As I discuss elsewhere, these latter arguments may be based on religious—rather 
than scientific—grounds.
30
 The extent to which they are relevant is consequently 
dependent on one’s religious views and, generally, national policies in liberal states 
should not be determined on such religious basis. Nonetheless, posthumous 
conception undoubtedly further complicates parental reproductive choice. It expands 
the concept of reproductive freedom beyond the lifetime of the individual. It also 
raises significant questions about the limits of reproductive choice. The suggestion 
that people might use the genetic material of their deceased children—and the 
increasing number of requests to do this—exemplifies this issue. Can an individual 
claim a right to become a grandparent? And what are the limits of consent in such 
scenarios? A situation where future grandparents donate the genetic material of their 
deceased child so that another man or a woman becomes a parent is relatively 
uncomplicated.
31
 In such instances, the recipient parent holds the primary 
responsibilities for the child, and the grandparents may or may not have a 
relationship with the resulting child. But can the deceased request that his or her 
mother (and future grandparent) carry the pregnancy? Can the future grandmother 
consent to such a request or choose it on her own? Should fertility clinics accept 
such requests or consent? These questions, combined with the fact that the 
implications of all these possibilities on the resulting child are unclear, shift 
posthumous conception from a mere matter of privacy to one that may have 
significant implications for the public interest.
32
 
                                                 
 26 Eric Blyth, To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children 
Conceived through New Reproductive Technologies, 16 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 505, 506 
(2008). 
 27 ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: 
THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS 15–16 
(2006), available at http://familyscholars.org/2006/01/01/the-revolution-in-parenthood/. 
 28 J.A.M. Hunfeld, et al. Protect the Child from Being Born: Arguments Against IVF from 
Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 22 J. 
REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOLOGY 279, 284 (2004); Katz, supra note 13, at 309–10. 
 29 Kristin L. Antall, Who is My Mother?: Why States Should Ban Posthumous 
Reproduction by Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203, 227–29 (1999). 
 30 Maya Sabatello, Are the Kids All Right? A Child-Centered Approach to Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 74, 82–84 (2013). 
 31 See infra Part III. 
 32 Simpson, supra note 14, at 2. 
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As a matter of policy, it is possible to regulate this field so as to prohibit any or 
all such scenarios of posthumously conceived children. Indeed, this is the position 
endorsed in France, Germany, and Sweden, for instance.
33
 However, it is unlikely to 
be universally endorsed. In the United States, assisted reproductive technology is a 
highly lucrative business, primarily in private hands.
34
 There is consequently little 
incentive to curb it and great difficulty in doing so. Moreover, some countries 
explicitly allow posthumous conception when certain conditions are met. For 
instance, in the state of Victoria, Australia, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 
of 2008 permits posthumous conception when the recipient was married to the 
deceased partner, the deceased provided written consent for the procedure, the 
recipient received counseling prior to the treatment about the grieving process and 
the possible impact on the child to be born as a result of the treatment, and the 
Patient Review Panel approved the use of gametes or embryos.
35
 The United 
Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008 similarly allows for 
posthumous conception when the deceased provided sperm and consented in writing 
both for the use of his sperm by a specific woman after his death and for being 
treated for the purpose of parentage registration in the birth certificate as the father 
of any resulting child.
36
 This law also makes arrangements for situations where an 
embryo was created during a marriage or a civil partnership using the sperm of a 
donor (rather than of the deceased) with the consent of the deceased.
37
 The recipient 
woman is additionally required to acknowledge in writing, within forty-two days of 
the child’s birth, the deceased’s parentage.
38
 And while the New Zealand Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 does not dedicate a separate section 
to posthumous conception, it allows such conceptions when the condition of 
informed consent for the collection of gametes, embryos, or both, is met.
39
  
Finally, the rise of “rights talk” combined with new medical practices plays an 
important role in the endorsement of posthumous conception as a legitimate form of 
reproduction. Doctors encourage patients who undergo medical treatment that may 
                                                 
 33 Hans, supra note 7, at 893. 
 34 See Daar, supra note 13, at 36. 
 35 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 46, 91(c), 96(c) (Austl.); see also 
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2009 (Vic) s 11 (Austl.). There are no 
comprehensive national regulations of assisted reproductive technologies in Australia, and the 
individual states are free to adopt relevant arrangements. However, the Australian government 
issued ethical standards guiding the practice in 2007. These regulations allow for posthumous 
conception if the deceased or the near dying person has left a clearly expressed and witnessed 
direction consenting to the use of his or her gametes, the prospective parent received 
counseling about the consequences of such use, and an appropriate period of time for the 
grieving process was taken before assisting in conception attempts. Ethical Guidelines on the 
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research 2004, (Cth) ss 
6.15–16 (Austl.). 
 36 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 39 (Eng.). This amendment to 
the Act is the result of the 2003 legal struggle of Diane Blood to have her dead husband 
registered as the father of her posthumously conceived children. 
 37 Id. §§ 40(1), 40(2), 42 (Eng.). 
 38 Id. §§ 39(d), 40(f) (Eng.). 
 39 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (N.Z.).  
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negatively affect their reproduction (such as cancer patients undergoing 
chemotherapy) to preserve sperm or eggs beforehand, and such harvesting is part of 
routine medical practice today.
40
 As some may eventually succumb to the disease, 
their stored gametes may be available for use. Beyond that, because reproduction is 
viewed as a fundamental right, individuals and governments are increasingly 
invested in protecting it. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Ministry of 
Defense provides “all military personnel with pre-deployment advice on fertility 
preservation,” and although pre-deployment preservation is not funded by the 
government, it is reported that a “government-recognized program will allow British 
soldiers to continue their bloodline even if mortally wounded in battle.”
41
 In the 
United States, while pre-deployment fertility preservation by soldiers is privately 
organized and funded, it is reported as a growing (and accepted) trend among 
soldiers deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.
42
 And in Israel, 
although there are no comprehensive national regulations of assisted reproductive 
technologies, posthumous conception is increasingly viewed as a right on its own—
and is extended to future grandparents.
43
 Young adults entering the army and other 
individuals are encouraged to sign a so-called “biological will” to specify what 
should be done with genetic material in case of death.
44
 More than six hundred such 
wills were already signed and they are deposited in the first and only bank for 
biological wills in the world.
45
  
Prohibiting posthumous conception is further difficult given globalization and the 
so-called phenomenon of fertility tourism, in which individuals and couples travel 
outside of their home country to receive fertility treatment and other services such as 
surrogacy and gamete donation.
46
 The reality is that those who want the opportunity 
                                                 
 40 Sara E. Barton et al., Population-Based Study of Attitudes Toward Posthumous 
Reproduction, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 735, 735–36 (2012).  
 41 Jim Kouri, Brit Soldiers in Afghanistan Freezing Sperm, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 2011, 
http://www.examiner.com/article/brit-soldiers-afghanistan-freezing-sperm; Sperm Freezing 
Should be Funded by MoD: Injured Soldier, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-13709751?print=true.  
 42 Valerie Alvord, Troops Start Trend with Sperm Banks, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2003, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-26-sperm-inside_x.htm#.  
 43 Grandparents Rights, NEW FAMILY, http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/grandparents-
rights/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).  
 44 Ronny Linder-Ganz, Reservists Ask for Their Sperm to Be Frozen if They Die, HAARETZ 
(Isr.), Sept. 26, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/reservists-ask-for-
their-sperm-to-be-frozen-if-they-die.premium-1.479114.  
 45 The Bank for biological wills was established by the New Family Organization, a 
leading family rights non-governmental organization that promoted the issue. Both the 
concept of biological will and the bank are protected under patent laws. For further 
information see, www.newfamily.org.il.  
 46 Smerdon, supra note 10, at 24–26; Richard F. Storrow, Family Tales: The Handmaid’s 
Tale of Fertility Tourism: Passports and Third Parties in the Religious Regulation of Assisted 
Conception, 12 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 189, 202–03 (2005–2006). 
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to have a child with their deceased loved ones will find a way to do so.
47
 The 
practice of posthumous conception is, thus, unlikely to disappear anytime soon.  
Assuming that children should not pay the price of parental decisions, it is 
important to consider how to uphold the interests and rights of children that are born 
from posthumous conception. Yet, to what extent have courts deciding on cases 
involving posthumously conceived children done so? 
II.  POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION IN COURTS 
Since the victorious ruling in the Blood case that enabled Diane to procreate 
through the use of her dead husband’s sperm in 1997, many cases pertaining to 
posthumous conception have arrived in courts. Specifically, four types of cases can 
be observed.  
In the first kind of case, a person requests permission to harvest gametes from a 
recently-deceased or dying patient. Such cases are especially prevalent in 
Australia.
48
 They are rather urgent given the time limits on extracting viable sperm 
or eggs,
49
 and commonly in such cases, an additional court decision is required in 
order to get permission to use the harvested gametes.
50
 This is also an instance of the 
second type of case. A surviving partner or parent might ask for permission to use 
the gametes that the deceased had frozen before going onto a medical treatment 
(such as chemotherapy) or had asked to have harvested shortly before or after death. 
Both Australian and Israeli courts have delivered opinions in this regard.
51
 In the 
                                                 
 47 In ex parte Blood, the British Court ruled that although the harvesting of sperm from 
Ms. Blood’s dying husband should not have taken place given the lack of clear and written 
consent, once it was done Ms. Blood had the right, under the law of the European Community, 
to export the sperm for the purpose of received medical treatment in other EU members. R. v 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 4003, 
[70], [1997] 2 WLR 806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.). Subsequently, Ms. Blood conceived her two 
children in fertility clinics in Belgium. Lucie Morris, Second Baby for Diane Blood, DAILY 
MAIL (Sept. 26, 2013) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-128719/Second-baby-Diane-
Blood.html; see also Derek Morgan & Robert G. Lee, In the Name of the Father? Ex Parte 
Blood: Dealing with Novelty and Anomaly, 60 MOD. L. REV. 840 (1997) (discussing the 
European standards regarding free movement and services); Benjamin Kroon et al., Post-
mortem Sperm Retrieval in Australia, 52 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 487, 
488 (2012) (discussing the law in Victoria, Australia that allows exportation of retrieved 
sperm to a State or a Territory that allows use without written consent of the deceased). 
 48 In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390 (Austl.); MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. 
[2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231 (Austl.); S v Minister for Health (WA) [2008] WASC 
262 (Austl.); Re Floyd [2011] QSC 218 (Austl.); Re H, AE [2012] SASC 146 (Austl.). 
 49 The medical recommendation for posthumous harvesting and preservation of sperm is 
that extraction take place within twenty-four hours after death, although the sperm may 
remain viable longer (up to forty-eight hours) if the body has been cooled. Katrina Bills, The 
Ethics and Legality of Posthumous Conception, 9 S. CROSS U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005); Bryce 
Weber, Ron Kodama, and Keith Jarvi, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Canadian 
Perspective, 30 J. ANDROLOGY 407, 407 (2009).  
 50 See In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC at ¶ 4; see also S v Minister for Health, [2008] 
WASC at ¶¶ 17, 25; Re H, AE, [2012] SASC at ¶¶ 12, 49. 
 51 Vallance & Marco [2012] FamCA 653 (Austl.); Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the 
late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (Austl.); Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177 (Austl.); 
AB v Attorney-General of Victoria [2005] VSC 180 (Austl.); 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), 
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third type of case, a posthumously conceived child has already been born and the 
surviving parent (generally, the widow) submits a request for recognition of the 
deceased’s parentage. Diane Blood, for instance, had filed such a request in the 
United Kingdom after the birth of her first son.
52
 These requests are especially 
prevalent in Japan where all legal cases of posthumous conception focus on the issue 
of parentage acknowledgment and registration in the child’s birth certificate.
53
 
Finally, in the fourth type of case, the courts were called upon to determine whether 
a posthumously conceived child should have inheritance rights and/or receive social 
security benefits as the dependent of the deceased—a request that is especially 
prevalent in the United States.
54
 
The reasons for the national differences in judicial requests may be grounded in 
the disparate legal regulations of assisted reproductive technologies in these 
countries, as well as in their very different cultural understandings of procreation. In 
the United States, where assisted reproductive technologies are lightly regulated, 
decisions about harvesting gametes are often in the hands of medical ethics 
committees. Once the request is approved, the decision of using these gametes for 
the purpose of creating a child is further in the hands of private fertility clinics that 
independently provide such services. Thus, for the most part, when courts are called 
to respond to cases of posthumous conception the child already exists and the issue 
at stake is mainly the relationship between the state and the child—especially the 
privileges the child will receive. Similarly, in Japan, there is no regulatory 
                                                                                                                   
New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) (Isr.) [hereinafter NFO]; Katy Sinclair, Israeli 
Court Allows Use of Dead Soldier’s Sperm, BIONEWS (Jan.20, 2007), http://www.bionews.
org.uk/page_12974.asp; Andrew Vorzimer, Court Rules that Widow Can Use Dead 
Husband’s Sperm, THE SPIN DOCTOR (May 24, 2011), http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2011/
05/24/court-rules-widow-dead-husbands-sperm/; see also, Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (providing a U.S. decision); Ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA 
(Civ) 4003 (providing a U.K. decision). 
 52 Blood Claims IVF Paternity Victory, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/
2807707.stm (last updated Feb. 28, 2003); Neil Connor, Campaigner is Confident of Paternity 
Declaration, THE BIRMINGHAM POST (Eng.), Mar. 1, 2003, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=98239278. 
 53 Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek 
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7 
(Japan); Noriyuki Ueda et al., Study of Views on Posthumous Reproduction, Focusing on Its 
Relation with Views on Family and Religion in Modern Japan, 62 ACTA MED. OKAYAMA 285, 
286. A few cases in Russia concern the registration of posthumously conceived children when 
the grandmother requests registration. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy: Grandmother Fights 
for Late Son’s Kids, RT NEWS (Russ.), June 7, 2011, http://rt.com/news/frozen-sperm-
surrogacy-maternity/; Irina Pulya, Posthumous Grandchildren, RUSSIA BEYOND THE 
HEADLINES (Russ.), June 16, 2011, http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/06/16/posthumous_
grandchildren_13047.html. 
 54 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); 
Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002); Khabbaz v. Comm’r, 
Soc. Sec. Admin. 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 
(Ark. 2008); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2004); Stephen v. 
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In Re Martin B., 841 
N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (Sur. Ct. 2007); Vernoff v. Astrue 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 202526 (2012). 
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framework of law or guidelines concerning assisted reproductive technologies, and 
the actual procedure is in private hands.
55
 Judicial resolutions are therefore called for 
only when the child exists. The focus on parentage acknowledgement and 
registration further reflects the importance of the blood-line and family continuation 
in Japanese culture.
56
 
The situation is different in countries which regulate assisted reproductive 
technologies and allow posthumous conception. For instance, in Victoria, Australia 
parental acknowledgement in the child’s birth certificate is part of the established 
system,
57
 as it is in British Columbia, Canada, when the deceased was married or in 
a marriage-like relationship and consented to the use of his or her gametes after 
death.
58
 Following another suit by Diane Blood, in which it was accepted at the High 
Court in London that the lack of such acknowledgment violated her children’s rights 
to privacy and family life,
59
 the Parliament in the United Kingdom also revised the 
regulation of parental registration.
60
 It subsequently adopted an amendment to the 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990, in 2003 (now formally included in the 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008) so that birth certificates for posthumously 
conceived children would register the deceased as the father rather than leave the 
line for the father’s name blank.
61
 The Act of 2008 further allows a woman who is in 
a relationship with another woman to register as the other parent of a child.
62
 Thus, 
in such countries, people seeking to harvest and subsequently use gametes must 
approach the judiciary when there is a question of whether they have met the 
threshold conditions, especially the consent of the deceased. Finally, the legal 
framework in Israel also reflects the dilemmas being presented to courts. Although 
there are no comprehensive national regulations about assisted reproductive 
technologies, the national healthcare system offers fertility treatments.
63
 Moreover, 
                                                 
 55 Mayumi Mayeda, Present State of Reproductive Medicine in Japan—Ethical Issues with 
a Focus on Those Seen in Court Cases, 7 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS 2, 15 (2006). 
 56 Ueda, supra note 53, at 294. 
 57 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) pt 5 (Austl.) (recognizing and 
registering the deceased—whether a man or a woman in a heterosexual relationship, or a 
woman in a same-sex relationship—as a parent of the posthumously conceived child). 
 58 Alberta Law Reform Inst., supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 59 Blood Claims IVF Paternity Victory, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2003), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2807707.stm. 
 60 Clare Dyer, Diane Blood Law Victory Gives Her Sons Their 'Legal' Father, GUARDIAN, 
Sep. 18, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2003/sep/19/genetics.uknews. 
 61 Human Fertilization and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Bill, 2003, H.L. Bill [78] cl. 1 
(U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/078/03078.1-
4.html. For the Parliamentary discussion on this amendment to the Act see 25 Apr. 2001, 
PARL. DEB., H.C. Standing Committee G (2001) (U.K.), available at  http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/g/st010425/am/10425s01.htm; see also Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 48 (U.K.). 
 62 Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, c. 22, § 48 (U.K.). 
 63 Arich Raziel et al., Nationwide Use of Postmortem Retrieved Sperm in Israel: a Follow-
up Report, 95 AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 2693, 269395 (2011) (reporting that most of 
the harvested gametes are ultimately not used however). 
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the country’s cultural emphasis on procreation and “continuation of the family line,” 
along with its mandatory military service, has created a greater acceptance of 
posthumous conceptions.
64
 Consequently, in practice, requests for the harvesting or 
use of sperm or eggs may often be resolved by turning to the state attorney; only a 
handful of more controversial cases come to court.
65
  
The next Part considers the legal discourse on posthumously conceived children. 
It observes the extent to which courts have addressed the welfare and best interests 
of posthumously conceived children in their rulings, and analyzes the scope and 
meaning of relevant decisions.  
III.  THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
Regardless of the type of case that reaches court, it is pertinent to explore the 
place posthumously conceived children occupy in judicial decisions. After all, the 
goal of requests for harvesting gametes, or for the use of frozen ones, is to achieve a 
pregnancy that will result in the birth of a child. In some cases, calculations of a 
child’s welfare and best interests inherently fall into abstract thinking,
66
 but when a 
fertility treatment has succeeded, and a child already exists, a case is necessarily 
concrete. It would therefore be reasonable to expect that considerations of the 
welfare and best interest of the posthumously conceived children will be part of the 
discussion, just as in other cases concerning children in the family sphere. 
This expectation is especially pertinent given the CRC’s requirement that states 
attend to children’s interests and best interests. This international treaty, which 
entered into force in 1991 and has been almost universally ratified (the exceptions 
are the United States and Somalia),
67
 aimed to create a children’s rights 
revolution.
68
 Recognizing children as subjects and as bearers of rights, its provisions 
are aimed at protecting the equal rights of all children up to the age of 18, regardless 
of their race, religion, nationality, and importantly, also birth or other status.
69
 
Moreover, among its core provisions is the explicit requirement that, “In all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
70
 Article 3(2) further requires 
states “to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her 
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
                                                 
 64 Id. at 2694.  
 65 Telephone Interview with New Family Organization (Feb. 2013). 
 66 Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 459. 
 67 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 1577, Art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
44/a44r025.htm. 
 68 MAYA SABATELLO, CHILDREN’S BIOETHICS: THE INTERNATIONAL BIOPOLITCAL 
DISCOURSE ON HARMFUL TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AND THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO CULTURAL 
IDENTITY 2733 (2009) (describing the revolutionary and innovative provisions of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
 69 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67.   
 70 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Article 3(1). 
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shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.”
71
 Thus, although 
the CRC does not explicitly stipulate posthumously conceived children—indeed, it is 
doubtful that at the time of its adoption, the drafters could possibly envision such 
children—there can be no doubt that posthumously conceived children fall within 
the CRC’s scope of protection. 
Disturbingly, however, this is often not the case. An examination of judicial 
decisions and media reports from various countries, including the United States, 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Russia, and Israel shows that 
courts are overwhelmingly focused on the question of consent and the reproductive 
freedom of the adults involved,
72
 on the property-like characteristics of gametes,
73
 
and on states’ interests in the orderly administration of estates and their intestate law, 
as relevant for inheritance and social security benefits.
74
 In some instances, the 
judicial neglect of children is more blatant. A decision by the Russian Civil Registry 
Office is a vivid example.
75
 In this case, a woman who used the sperm of her dead 
son to fertilize an egg from an anonymous donor and hired a surrogate to bear the 
grandchild requested that the authorities issue a birth certificate.
76
 The authorities 
refused, stating that the child was born two years after the death of the deceased; 
they added that “because the egg donor was anonymous, the baby also does not have 
a mother.”
77
 Consequently, the Civil Registry Office decided that “the baby has no 
legal parents, does not officially exist, and cannot have a birth certificate.”
78
 Further, 
                                                 
 71 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Article 3(2). 
 72 MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 23, ¶ 43 
(Austl.); In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 23(a) (Austl.); R. v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 4003, [3][28], [1997] 2 WLR 
806 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.); 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. 
Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.1 (Isr.). 
 73 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); In the matter 
of Gray [2000] QSC at ¶¶ 1122; Re H, AE (No 2) [2012] SASC 177, ¶¶ 4658 (Austl.); 
Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478, ¶¶ 4178 
(Austl.); New Family Org., 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot) at ¶ 6. 
 74 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 59799 (9th Cir. 2004); Vernoff v. Astrue 
568 F.3d 1102, 111012 (9th Cir. 2009); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 85254 (Ark. 
2008); Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002); In re Certified 
Question from the U.S. District Court, W.D. of Michigan, 825 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Mich. 2012); 
Khabbaz v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. 930 A.2d 1180, 118284 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. 
Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 85254 (Ark. 2008). 
 75 A similar response is reported from a case delivered by the District Court in Russia. In 
this case, a divorcee grandmother requested to be registered as the guardian of two pairs of 
twins. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53.  The 
children were conceived from her deceased son’s sperm and donated eggs and born through 
two surrogates. See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53.  
In denying her request, the court stated that, because under Russian law only married couples 
can use surrogates “the four children five months old at the time have no legal mother and 
father. . . .” See From Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; see also Pulya, supra note 53.   
 76 Leidig, supra note 20, at 627.  
 77 Leidig, supra note 20, at 627. 
 78 Leidig, supra note 20, at 627. 
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according to the media report of the case, the Civil Registry Office suggested that the 
grandmother “has no claim on the boy, and as she is too old to adopt him it wants to 
take him away from her and place him in an orphanage.”
79
  
Clearly, such a response is astonishing. The child’s existence is not dependent on 
any formal recognition of his or her parents. A child’s birth is an objective fact that, 
under international law, states are required to document by issuing a birth 
certificate.
80
 Further, even if a state may legitimately set an age limitation on 
prospective parents who want to adopt a child, it is most likely that placing the child 
in an orphanage will be a far worse option. In the particular instance of this case, 
while it is unclear whether the fifty-five-year-old grandmother in fact requested to 
adopt the child (as might be implied by the response of the Civil Registry Office), 
there is no doubt that the child was very much wanted and taken care of, thus 
undermining the rationales for placing the child in an orphanage—an option that is, 
and must be, a last resort. And in any case, the child’s birth registration should 
always be separate from the question of adoption. Simply stated, the position of the 
Civil Registry Office could only have been made by entirely ignoring the child’s 
interests. 
 Still, some exceptions merit attention. Specifically, nine judicial decisions have 
raised the issue of child welfare and best interest in a substantive manner as a 
consideration in decision-making. The first two cases addressed requests for the 
harvesting of sperm. In MAW v. Western Sydney Area Health Services,
81
 heard by 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, the couple in question was 
married for seven years when the husband was struck by a heavy vehicle.
82
 He was 
subsequently admitted to the hospital where he was diagnosed as near brain dead and 
put on life support.
83
 At the time that his wife filed the request with the court, his life 
expectancy was estimated at approximately forty-eight hours.
84
 He was twenty-five 
                                                 
 79 Leidig, supra note 20, at 627. 
 80 Article 7 of the CRC states:  
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents.  
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in 
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 7; see also Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 8 (requiring states “to respect the right of the child 
to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized 
by law without unlawful interference.” Sub-Article (2) further stipulates that “[w]here a child 
is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall 
provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or 
her identity). 
 81 MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶¶ 1, 9, 11 
(Austl.). 
 82 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 83 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 84 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2. 
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years old, the applicant was twenty-eight, and they did not yet have any children.
85
 
According to the records, the couple had originally decided to postpone parenthood 
“until they got on their feet financially.”
86
 They further discussed having children 
from time to time but put off the decision. A few months before the accident, the 
husband discussed with his wife, in what was described as “a jocose way,” the 
possibility of him having a vasectomy after making a semen donation.
87
 Although 
the couple never pursued any course of action, these discussions were critical in the 
court’s decision to dismiss her request;
88
 indeed, the applicant’s testimony that her 
husband indicated “that if they were to have a child, he wanted the child to carry on 
the W name”
89
 failed to persuade the court otherwise. 
In the matter of Gray
90
 (heard by the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia), 
the couple had been married for six years, and had a one-year-old child, when the 
thirty-seven-year-old husband died unexpectedly in his sleep. The applicant, who 
was forty-two years old, submitted the request to harvest his sperm for the purpose 
of procreation. She testified that they had discussed having another child and that 
“their intentions [were] to do so in the near future.”
91
 As in the previous case, the 
parents of the deceased supported the spouse’s request.
92
  
Although both cases were dismissed, essentially, on the grounds of lack of the 
deceased’s consent to harvest his sperm,
93
 the courts raised the welfare and best 
interests of prospective posthumously conceived children as well, as stated in the 
MAW case, as “another factor militating against the recognition of such a new 
special category.”
94
 In the case of MAW, the court explained that,  
 
Such a child will never have the prospect of knowing his father. Such a 
child would come to recognise that he or she was not sought to be 
procreated during the life of the father. Such a child would not have rights 
of succession. . . . Furthermore, should the circumstances of the child’s 
conception come to be known there would be people in the community 
                                                 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at ¶ 12. 
 87 Id. at ¶ 14. 
 88 Id. at ¶ 14. 
 89 Id. at ¶ 15. 
 90 In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 1 (Austl.). 
 91 Id. at ¶ 1, 2. 
 92 Id. at ¶ 6. 
 93 MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶¶ 5, 7, 17-21, 24, 27-50, 51-62; see also In the matter of 
Gray, [2000] QSC at ¶ 23(a) (resolving that in the lack of legislation, the court has no 
jurisdiction). In both cases, the court also resolved that in the lack of legislation it has no 
jurisdiction. MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶¶ 2750, as well as ¶¶ 5162; In the matter of Gray, 
[2000] QSC at ¶¶ 5, 7, 24. 
 94 MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶ 43. 
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who would tend to regard the child as different –not a happy situation, 
especially for the child.
95
 
The court subsequently stated that “I cannot conclude that such a child’s best 
interests would be served by being brought into existence in the manner, at the time 
and in the circumstances contemplated as possible by the plaintiff.”
96
 
Similarly, In the matter of Gray the court opined, in regard to the harvesting 
request, that,  
 
I cannot see how it can be said that the interests of such a child will be 
advanced by inevitable fatherlessness. The very nature of the conception 
may cause the child embarrassment or more serious emotional problems 
as it grows up. More significantly, because the court can never know in 
what circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is impossible 
to know what is in its best interests.
97
 
 
Subsequently, the court concluded that this case did not raise legal “challenges for 
which there may be no adequate precedent,” that “good sense and ordinary concepts 
of morality should be a sufficient guide for many of the problems that will arise 
[with the expansion of medical technology],” and that if these are insufficient, it 
should be left to the legislator to provide another legal response.
98
 
The third case was heard by the High Court of Japan in 2004.
99
 This case 
involved the request of a widow that her dead husband be acknowledged as the 
father of her posthumously conceived child, born eighteen months after the father’s 
death.
100
 In this case, the husband had preserved sperm while going through cancer 
treatment, and the couple was in the process of getting an approval for IVF when he 
died.
101
 The deceased’s consent was not contested, and his parents were also fully 
involved and supported the widow’s decision to continue the IVF treatment after he 
died.
102
  
However, reversing the decision of the lower court, the Japanese High Court 
dismissed the request.
103
 While it did so presumably on the ground of lack of 
legislation,
104
 it highlighted considerations relating to the child as well. The court 
ruled that it is impossible to establish a parent-child relationship in such scenario 
                                                 
 95 MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶ 43. 
 96 MAW, [2000] NSWSC at ¶ 44. 
 97 In the matter of Gray, [2000] QSC at ¶ 23(c).  
 98 In the matter of Gray, [2000] QSC at ¶ 24. 
 99 Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek 
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7, 
¶ 1, 2 (Japan). 
 100 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 101 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2. 
 102 Id. at ¶1. 
 103 Id. at, ¶ 3. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 4. 
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because there is no possibility for the father to have parental authority over the child; 
nor is it possible for the child to enjoy the father’s custody, care, or support; nor 
could the child become the father’s heir.
105
 In concurring opinions, other justices 
provided additional justifications. They emphasized that the existence of a “blood 
relationship” cannot necessarily be a reason to legally recognize parent-child 
relations, stating that, in general, a child is born with both father and mother being 
alive who provide him or her the environment in which they mentally or materially 
bless him or her.
106
 Moreover, while Justice Imai Isao pointed out that the court 
should consider the existing child, and that “there should be no objection to giving 
priority to the welfare of the child,” he nonetheless found the benefits of registration 
insignificant
107
—even though it was explicitly acknowledged that leaving a blank in 
the section for father in the family register causes considerable social disadvantages 
to the child,
108
 and despite the indisputable benefit of registration in that it would 
enable the child to claim kinship with the father’s relatives, including possible rights 
and obligations of support between them.
109
 
In three other cases concerning inheritance and the social benefit rights of 
posthumously conceived children, all heard by courts in the United States, the judges 
considered the welfare and best interests of the child. In the case of Lauren 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,
110
 a widow asked the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts to rule on whether twin girls born following her use 
of her deceased husband’s sperm were eligible for inheritance and social security 
benefits under Massachusetts’ intestacy law. The husband had deposited sperm just 
before entering medical treatment for leukemia; the twins were born two years after 
his death.
111
 While the Court generally accepted that interpretation of Massachusetts 
law allows posthumously conceived children to inherit and receive social security 
benefits, it did not decide the particular case, remanding it to the Probate and Family 
Court for further evidence concerning the deceased’s explicit consent to both the use 
of his sperm after his death and to support the resulting child.
112
 Its opinion on 
posthumously conceived children is yet important.  
In its decision, the Court stipulated state interests that need to be balanced: the 
child’s best interests, the state’s interest in the orderly administration of estates, and 
the reproductive rights of the genetic parent.
113
 Importantly, the Court emphasized 
                                                 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 107 Id. at ¶ ¶ 45. 
 108 Id. at ¶ 3 (explicitly acknowledging that “the family register in Japan is an important 
system that has no equivalent in other countries, and a blank in section of father in the family 
register causes considerable social disadvantages to the child.”). 
 109 Id. at ¶ 5. 
 110 Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 111 Id. at 260. 
 112 Id. at 272. The Court stipulated a two-fold consent requirement from the deceased: 
consent that his gamete is used for procreation after his death (a genetic-biological 
connection) and consent to the support of any resulting child. Id. The Court was not persuaded 
that the latter existed. Id. 
 113 Id.at 265. 
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the overriding legislative concern to protect minor children, “most especially those 
who may be stigmatized by their ‘illegitimate’ status,”
114
 including posthumously 
conceived children within the scope of this protection. The Court highlighted that the 
legislature encouraged assisted reproductive technologies
115
 and that it would 
therefore be inconsistent and irrational to suggest that children resulting from such 
technologies have fewer rights and protections than other children.
116
 The Court 
further stated unequivocally that “posthumously conceived children may not come 
into the world the way the majority children do, but they are children 
nonetheless.”
117
 The Court thus concluded that, generally, they are “entitled, in so 
far as possible, to the same rights and protections of law” as children conceived 
before death.
118
  
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
119
 the United States Ninth Appellate Circuit 
accepted the plaintiff-appellant’s assertion that her minor children, conceived after 
the death of her husband, were entitled to insurance benefits under Arizona law. In 
this case, the deceased deposited sperm before undergoing chemotherapy for cancer, 
and there was no dispute as to his wish that his widow have their child after his 
death.
120
 In reaching its conclusion, the court took a broad interpretive approach to 
the criteria of the Social Security Act. It stated that once the parentage question is 
undisputed, as in the present case, the requirement of proving dependency should be 
automatically interpreted as inherently inclusive of all legitimate children.
121
 As the 
court emphasized,  
 
It has long been the policy of the state to protect innocent children from 
the omissions of their parents by abolishing legal distinctions based on 
legitimacy . . . Although Arizona law does not deal specifically with 
posthumously conceived children, every child in Arizona, which 
necessarily includes Juliet and Piers [the children of the deceased], is the 
legitimate child of her or his natural parents.
122
 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Surrogate’s Court of New York. In In 
the Matter of the Construction of Agreements among Martin B., as Grantor, and 
Martin B. et al, as Trustees,
123
 the court resolved that two infants conceived by the 
widow after the deceased’s death were “issue” of “descendants” protected under the 
                                                 
 114 Id. 
 115 Massachusetts provides universal healthcare and insurance coverage for infertility 
treatment. Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 266. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 120 Id. at 59495. 
 121 Id. at 59798. 
 122 Id. at 59899. 
 123 In Re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007). 
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trust fund. While the court acknowledged that “certainty and finality are critical to 
the public interests in the orderly administration of estates,” it also highlighted that 
“the human desire to have children, albeit by biotechnology, deserves respect, as do 
the rights of the children born as a result of such scientific advances.”
124
 Further, it 
emphasized that “if an individual considers a child to be his or her own, society 
through its laws should do so as well,” leading to its conclusion that the two 
posthumously conceived children should be treated as part of their father’s family 
for all purposes.
125
 As the court stipulated, “where a governing instrument is silent, 
children born of this new biotechnology with the consent of their parent are entitled 
to the same rights “for all purposes as those of a natural child.”
126
 
A seventh relevant case, New Family Organization et al v. Rambam Medical 
Center et al
127
 was delivered by the Family Court Hakrayot in 2009. In this case, a 
forty-year-old single woman requested the court’s permission to use the sperm of a 
man who died at twenty-two after preserving his sperm when he received treatment 
for cancer.
128
 According to his parents, he expressed a desire for them to have his 
grandchildren with his sperm.
129
 Although the woman never knew the man or his 
family, the family fully supported her request to be impregnated with their son’s 
sperm.
130
 The parents of the deceased and the woman also signed an agreement to 
regulate their relationships.
131
  
In approving the request, the court gave the most comprehensive examination to 
date of the welfare and best interests of the child. The court acknowledged some 
general concerns about the unique family structure and its possible financial impact 
given that the child will be raised in a single-parent household.
132
 It also noted the 
possibility of the child experiencing some identity issues.
133
 However, it ultimately 
emphasized that the decision has to take into account the specific facts of the 
case.
134
 Accordingly, it observed that a single-mother is not uncommon, while 
simultaneously pointing out that, in the present case, the family will already have an 
untraditional structure.
135
 The court noted that in the particular case, the applicant’s 
only alternative to posthumous conception from this known deceased would be 
conception through the use of sperm from an unknown donor.
136
 Given these 
                                                 
 124 Id. at 211. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) (Isr.). 
 128 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 129 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5.15.2. 
 130 Id. at introduction to the court’s decision and ¶ 1.  
 131 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 132 Id. at ¶ 5.2. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Id. at ¶¶ 5, 5.2. 
 135 Id. at ¶¶ 5.25.3.  
 136 Note: non-anonymous sperm donation is prohibited in Israel. 
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circumstances, the court raised the medical, psychological, and religious benefits of 
the child knowing his genetic origins and emphasized the right of the child to enjoy 
extended family relations of both parents as rationales for its decision.
137
 
Finally, two additional cases from Australia considered the issues of  child 
welfare and the child’s best interests in a substantial way: the Jocelyn Edwards 
case
138
 from the Supreme Court in New South Wales (May 2011) and Re H, AE (No 
2)
139
 from the Supreme Court of South Australia (October 2012). Both cases 
addressed whether a widow is entitled to possession of sperm that had been extracted 
from the widow’s dead husband. The extended families in both cases were also 
involved and supportive of the possibility of having a posthumously conceived 
grandchild. In the Edwards case, the couple had been married for five years, both 
individuals had children from previous relationships, and they were going through 
fertility treatment when the husband was fatally injured in a workplace accident.
140
 
The applicant, forty years old at the time of her husband’s death, further testified that 
when her husband had earlier experienced severe back pain and was being diagnosed 
for his condition, he explicitly said that, 
 
If something happens to me I would want a part of me to be here with 
you. Our baby will be a part of us—our legacy even after we are both 
gone. She will be the bond that unites our families. The bond between 
[their two children]. If we find out I have cancer I want to make sure we 
have our baby before I am unable to have one, before I do any chemo. 
Please promise me you will still have our baby.
141
  
 
In Re H, AE (No 2) case, the husband died as a result of a motor vehicle 
accident.
142
 The couple had been married at the time for just over a year, although 
they had also been domestic partners for five years prior to that.
143
 They were 
attempting to start a family. The deceased left a will making the applicant the 
residuary beneficiary of his estate.
144
 Shortly after his death, the applicant, twenty 
years old at the time, filed a request that doctors harvest the husband’s sperm.
145
 The 
court approved the request due to the urgency of the situation, with the condition that 
the sperm will not be used for any purpose without another order of the court.
146
 
                                                 
 137 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) (Isr.).  
 138 Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (Austl.). 
 139 Re H, AE (No 2)[2012] SASC 177 (Austl.). 
 140 Id. at ¶¶ 140. 
 141 Edwards, [2011] NSWSC at ¶ 108. 
 142 Re H, AE (No 2), [2012] SASC at ¶ 2. For the facts of the case, see ¶ 2535. 
 143 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 144 Id. at ¶ 26. 
 145 Id. at ¶¶ 23. 
 146 Id. at ¶ 2. 
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Five months later, the widow sought a declaration that she was entitled to possession 
of the sperm and an order for its release to her.
147
  
In contrast to the MAW and Gray cases, the Edwards and the Re H, AE (No. 2) 
courts approved the requests. In considering the child’s welfare and best interests, 
the courts emphasized the characteristics of the wife and the wider family support 
that would further ensure the child would be provided with the needed material 
support.
148
 The Edwards court, beyond finding that the child would be born to a 
loving mother and a supportive extended family, ultimately stated that “it would be 
inappropriate to engage in speculation about a variety of indeterminable matters”
149
 
such as the wife’s future health, her employment and financial situation, or whether 
she would remarry.
150
 
There are various reasons why courts granted the question of the welfare and best 
interests of posthumously conceived children greater attention in these recent cases. 
Changes in the family and family structures, especially but not only due to the 
availability of assisted reproductive technologies, have meant that the single-parent 
household is not abnormal in many societies as it was historically perceived to be.
151
 
The scope of the phenomenon of posthumously conceived children may further 
explain this shift. Certainly, it is not as common as other reproductive procedures 
such as IVF, surrogacy, or gamete donation. However, the number of requests for 
posthumous conception has significantly increased in the past decade,
152
 leading 
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 149 Id. at ¶ 144. 
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(discussing various possible scenarios for a child to be born when the father is not present and 
changes in family structure, concluding that “[i]t cannot be thought that because the child will 
only have one living parent that will necessarily not be in its best interests, particularly when 
the alternative is for the child not to exist at all.”). 
 151 Joanna L. Grossman, A Growing Debate Over the Rights of Posthumously Conceived 
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it was estimated that in 2003 the number of posthumously conceived children was between 
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also to a shift in the societal acceptance of such children. Indeed, recent studies of 
public opinion on this issue in both the United States and Japan show significant 
support (about 5078% and 60%, respectively).
153
 Finally, the rise of the children’s 
rights agenda, especially in the past decade, has played a role in this acceptance. As 
states are gradually internalizing their responsibilities under the CRC,
154
 courts all 
around the world are increasingly considering how their decisions affect the welfare 
and best interests of the child at stake. Moreover, the simultaneous rise of internet 
communication and globalization has created an additional international pressure.
155
 
They make injustices towards such children public and call for remedial measures. 
Notwithstanding these discussions, the scope of these judicial decisions is 
limited, and a few observations are in place. First, these rulings are local and 
commonly not comprehensive. The rights granted to a posthumously conceived child 
are dependent on the child’s place of birth—be it Japan, Australia, or Israel—or 
even, in light of the Capato case in the United States, on the particular state.
156
 
Moreover, even if courts are willing to acknowledge the familial surroundings of 
posthumously conceived children (as in the NFO, Edwards, and Re H, AE cases), 
they commonly deny those children inheritance and social benefit rights. The United 
States Supreme Court decision in Capato is illustrative in this regard. Whereas the 
Court refrained from any explicit and particular discussion about the twins’ welfare 
and best interests, its determination that the aim of the Social Security Act “was not 
to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’ . . . [but] to ‘provide  . . .  
dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship 
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings,’” led it to conclude that 
inheritance rights are to be determined by states’ intestacy laws.
157
 And while the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that states adopt different intestacy laws 
with regard to posthumously conceived children, it rejected the argument that 
                                                 
 153 Sara E. Barton et al., Population-based Study of Attitudes Toward Posthumous 
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heightened scrutiny is appropriate in the case, stating that “no showing has been 
made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted 
our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.”
158
 
Concurrently, the lessons that can be learnt from court cases where inheritance 
and social benefits for posthumously conceived children were granted are equally 
limited. While in In the Matter of Martin B., the court upheld the interests of the 
posthumously conceived children, the application in front of it merely required its 
confirmation of what was agreed upon by all parties rather than a resolution of a 
dispute.
159
 Conversely, in the Woodward case, the Court’s two-fold expectation that 
a deceased parent should explicitly consent to both the use of his sperm after his 
death and to support the resulting child
160
 may be too demanding given that it was 
not previously required. Despite the judicial statements of protecting the interests 
and rights of posthumously conceived children, then, the Court, in effect, erected a 
barrier that, in the present case, may be impossible to overcome. Further, it may be 
punishing posthumously conceived children for the failure of their parents’ to plan 
appropriately for an unknown possible future
161
—an undesirable result.  
Certainly, the lack of clear legislative statement about the rights of posthumously 
conceived children may reflect the common phenomenon that the legal system is not 
yet up to date with the developments of medical technologies. This problem is 
especially pertinent in the case of assisted reproductive technologies, not least 
because ensuing disagreements often lead to a legislative block.
162
 Yet while courts 
may be reluctant to interfere in the enactment of laws as a matter of separation of 
powers (indeed, this was also the formal justification for the decision of the Japanese 
Supreme Court),
163
 it is disturbing that the only victims of this lack of regulations 
are the children.  
A second observation is that judicial determination in each of these cases coupled 
the question of the child’s welfare and best interests with the courts’ perception—
and judgmental view—of the wife/future mother. In the MAW case, where the 
request was for the harvesting of sperm, the court interpreted the wife’s admission 
that she is emotional and that she would wait a few months before she makes a final 
decision about whether to proceed with using the sperm to mean that she blames 
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 159 In Re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (Sur. Ct. 2007). 
 160 Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002). 
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herself for not having a child while her husband was well
164
 and that she should not 
make decisions at all.
165
 Moreover, it interpreted her admission that bearing and 
caring for a child is time consuming and demanding as a sign that once the emotional 
crisis subsides “she is quite likely to change her mind about having a child.”
166
 
Similarly, In the matter of Gray, the Court stipulated that given the wife’s grief and 
shock from the unexpected death of her husband “[it] could have no confidence that 
the applicant’s desire is a result of careful or rational deliberation.”
167
 And in the 
Japanese case, the traditional conceptualization of the family as an institution that is 
associated directly with being a husband and wife seemingly led to judicial disdain 
of a single-mother household.
168
 Thus, although that court was correct that in 
general a child is born with both father and mother being alive, its refusal to do 
justice with a “different” family sends the practical message that maternal authority 
is not enough—even when supported by the extended family.
169
  
These judicial conclusions are logically peculiar. In MAW, it would have been 
wrong if the applicant was not emotional after losing her life partner, there is no 
doubt that child rearing is indeed demanding, and beyond anything else, her 
admission that she would wait before proceeding with using the sperm shows 
maternal responsibility (and certainly not guilt). Further, it is not at all clear why 
one’s (reasonably) emotional state should undermine rational thinking, as suggested 
by both the MAW and the Gray courts. Even if the women’s current state is 
emotional, it is further unclear why that justifies denying these women the 
opportunity for future careful and rational deliberation. The decisions are thus overly 
paternalistic. Similarly, in the Japanese case, although the child was already born, 
Justice Shigeo highlights that “it is still necessary to fully consider whether or not it 
is appropriate at all to give birth to such a child based on the sperm donor’s living 
consent”
170
 —implying that the mother’s decision to do so was simply wrong. As 
the courts are dismissive of the wives as competent decision-makers and as future 
good mothers, they deny the requests as though the decisions are grounded in the 
child’s best interests.  
Moreover, the decisions come across as merely reflecting the Justices’ personal 
opposing view rather than being grounded in law. Although the Japanese Court 
admits that the Civil Code that regulates parental acknowledgement was enacted in 
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the pre-assisted reproductive technologies era and that it should be extended beyond 
natural reproduction, Justice Shigeo views posthumously conceived children as 
“contrary to the providence of nature”
171
 which justifies, in his mind, the rejection of 
the application. The judicial disdain is most vivid in the MAW case: Justice O'Keefe 
went as far as to compare the cases of posthumously conceived children with the 
highly controversial question of the abortion of fetuses conceived by persons with 
developmental and mental disability or communicable diseases.
172
 Thus, not only 
did the Court strip away any agency that these women had as human beings, but it 
also implied that this “special new category”
173
 of posthumously conceived children 
is akin to a communicable disease and polluting of the social fabric.  
In contrast, in the more recent cases from Australia and Israel (the NFO, 
Edwards, and Re H, AE cases), the courts’ perception of the future mothers as 
loving, caring, and responsible
174
 set the tone for its subsequent observation that the 
support of their extended families is instrumental to the child’s development and 
sense of security. Certainly, the time at which the various rulings were delivered may 
account for at least some of the difference. Single parent household today are 
significantly more prevalent and socially accepted than they were a decade ago,
175
 
and it is possible that those judicial decisions simply mirror the societal shift. It may 
also be the case that the characteristics of the individual applicants in the various 
cases are what mobilized each court’s ruling. While this is not obvious from the facts 
of the cases, it is reasonable to suspect that the women in the Edwards and Re H, AE 
(No 2) cases were indeed less visibly emotional given the time that had passed since 
the deaths of their husbands (and the subsequent extraction of their sperm) and the 
time at which they requested to receive possession of the gamete.
176
 It is worth 
noting that the courts’ initial denial of the wives’ requests to extract sperm in the 
MAW and Gray cases also denied those wives the opportunity to overcome their 
initial grief.  
The third observation is that, generally, the courts upheld traditional family 
structure comprised of a man and a woman who are alive— a position that implicitly 
undermines, rather than endorses, the new families in which these children are 
raised. The judicial comments in this regard were most obvious in the MAW and 
                                                 
 171 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 172 MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶ 75 
(Austl.). 
 173 Id. at ¶ 79. 
 174 See supra Part III.  
 175 Grossman, supra note 151 (stating that, according to reports, forty-one percent of all 
American children were born to unmarried parents in 2011 and twenty-five percent of same-
sex couple households included children). 
 176 Indeed, interestingly, the emotional state of the applicant in the original request to 
extract sperm from her dead husband was not discussed at all, notwithstanding the fact that 
this request was made an hour within the death. Re H, AE [2012] SASC 146 (Austl.). There is 
no mentioning of Jocelyn Edwards emotional state as well. Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of 
the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (Austl.); see also Re Floyd [2011] QSC 218 
(Austl.) (the Court approves the request of a life partner of the deceased to extract his sperm 
although “the applicant was unable to appear in person because she is, unsurprisingly, in a 
state of extreme distress . . .”). 
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Gray cases, as well as in the Japanese case, where the courts explicitly emphasized 
the traditional marital relationship of a father and a mother at the time of conception 
as a central point.
177
 But, a similar result can be observed in the cases that approved 
the requests (even if unintentionally). In the NFO case, the explicit comparison with 
the known sperm donor
178
 reinforces the traditional conceptualization of the family 
unit and the importance attributed to the genetic—rather than social—tie. This 
emphasis implicitly undermines many of the new families that were created through 
the use of gamete donation. Further, the courts in all three cases—the New Family 
Organization, Edwards and Re H, AE (No. 2)—note that a single-mother household 
is an untraditional family structure and pay great importance to the material and 
other support that the parents of both the widow and the deceased will provide.
179
 
This too reflects the expectation of a traditional extended family. 
To be sure, there is nothing inherently wrong in bringing the extended family 
into consideration. Indeed, from a child-centered perspective there is little doubt that 
such relationships are important. The concern is, however, that the more that the 
courts ground the welfare and best interests of posthumously conceived children in 
the extension of the traditional family of one mother and one father, the harder it will 
be for posthumously conceived children who are born in the other scenarios sketched 
earlier—especially, families of more than two parents (as in the instance of the 
husband and frozen embryo from first wife) or of same-sex couples—to have their 
needs properly addressed and endorsed.
180
 And again, in so far that children should 
not pay the price of decisions made by their parents, it is important that in the future 
judicial rationales are sufficiently inclusive to cover these other scenarios as well. 
Finally, the courts’ use of terminology of welfare and best interests of the child 
does not necessarily mean that the judicial decision was in fact mobilized by any 
objective criteria of what the child’s welfare and best interests actually are. As the 
discussion of the judicial decisions shows, the courts have used the terminology of 
child welfare and best interests both to dismiss and to accept the requests made of 
it.
181
 The (bizarre) comment by the Gray Court in justifying its rejection of the 
request (that “it is impossible to know what is in [the child’s] best interests”
182
) 
especially reflects this manipulation of the concept of the child’s best interests. It 
shows, not only that determination of the child’s best interest is a regular, common, 
and indeed, expected part of the court’s decision, but also, this is in fact exactly what 
the court did in arriving at its decision. Furthermore, with the exception of the Israeli 
Court in the NFO case,
183
 none of the other Justices referred to any empirical studies 
                                                 
 177 See supra Part III.  
 178 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.2 
(Isr.). 
 179 See supra Part III.  
 180 See supra Part I.  
 181 Interestingly, although the Gillett-Netting court was especially supportive of protecting 
the rights and interests of posthumously conceived children, the decision does not include an 
explicit mention of the child welfare and best interests. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 
F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 182 In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 23(c) (Austl.). 
 183 New Family Org., 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot) at ¶ 5.2. 
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in support of their opinion. Quite the contrary, in the Japanese case, when a child 
already existed and the justices were aware of the considerable negative impact the 
lack of paternity registration would have on the child given the unique importance 
attributed to the family registry in Japan, they nonetheless opted to reject the 
registration request.
184
  
The vagueness of the concepts of child welfare and best interests may partially 
explain why courts can use these concepts to support whichever position each is 
inclined to adopt. This criticism is not new. Scholars have long charged that these 
concepts are too elastic, too open for abuse; and, to an extent, it is certainly true.
185
 
But as other alternative standards do not yet exist, the focus should be on how the 
flawed implementation of this measure can be improved.
186
 One such way, I 
suggest, is to consider whether the arguments raised correspond with children’s own 
views of their needs. Put differently, by listening to children’s experiences—as also 
required under the CRC
187
—the court can enrich the debate and inform the legal 
policies to be adopted. The next part considers the rights at stake of posthumously 
conceived children as judicial decisions have raised them and considers children’s 
perspectives thereof. 
IV.  POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
Judicial decisions concerning posthumous conception and scholarly work in their 
arena raise four main interests and rights of the resulting children: parentage 
acknowledgment, family structure, identity harm, and finally, inheritance and social 
benefits. Each of these is discussed separately below.  
A. Parentage Acknowledgement 
Should parentage acknowledgement of the deceased parent be established in the 
case of posthumously conceived children? In discussing this issue, courts have 
generally regarded biology, that is, whether there is a genetic or “blood” connection 
between the posthumously conceived children and the deceased, as a precondition 
for registration of parenthood.
188
 Additional requirements revolve around consent of 
the deceased (United States, Australia) or valid marriage (some states in the United 
States, Japan).
189
  
                                                 
 184 See Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek 
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7, 
¶ 3 (Japan). 
 185 SABATELLO, supra note 68, at 12027, 199. See Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 459; Kimberly 
M. Mutcherson, In Defense of Future Children: A Response to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests, 
96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 46, 5764 (2012). 
 186 See Mutcherson, supra note 185, at 61.  
 187 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 12. 
 188 Case to Seek Acknowledgement, 60 MINSHÜ 7 at ¶ 3; In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 
1257, 125859 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 
257, 272 (Mass. 2002); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 59899 (9th Cir.). 
 189 Contra Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (ruling that posthumously conceived children 
are legitimate children of the deceased as under Arizona law “every child is the legitimate 
child of its natural parents and is entitled to support . . . as if born in lawful wedlock.” Here 
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These conditions require further consideration. On the one hand, unwed genetic 
fathers who were tricked into having a child cannot prevent their parentage 
acknowledgement.
190
 This suggests that genetics, rather than consent or marriage, is 
the paramount aspect for parentage.
191
 On the other hand, familial relations often 
trump genetics. Indeed, in Western legal structure, including the United States, the 
bond between biological parenthood (particularly fatherhood) and parental-child 
acknowledgement was never a “natural given” but a social construct.
192
 One glaring 
example is the so-called presumption of paternity, a legal construct whereby it is 
assumed that the husband is the father of a child born into the marriage—although 
the number of children who are unknowingly raised by non-genetically related 
fathers is not marginal. In the United States, this number is estimated at one out of 
ten children born to a marriage; this number increases to one out of seven in the 
United Kingdom.
193
  
Children’s perspectives support the approach of social parenthood. Studies show 
that for children, especially in families that became possible with the developments 
of assisted reproductive technologies, genetics is not paramount; children determine 
parentage by the way in which they were raised, and especially, the fact that they 
were planned and wanted all along.
194
 These criteria can hardly be contested in the 
                                                                                                                   
too there was evidence, however, for the deceased husband’s consent for the posthumously 
conceived children.). 
 190 Paternity Fraud Rampant in the US, WND.COM (Feb. 18, 2006), http://www.wnd.com/
2006/02/34861 (Media reports and organizations dedicated to revealing “paternity fraud” 
estimate the rate at from fourteen percent to as high as thirty percent); See also 
PATERNITYFRAUD.COM, www.paternityfraud.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). 
 191 See Ruth Zafran, Dying to Be A Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous 
Conception, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 7174 (2007) (discussing the “genetic 
model”). 
 192 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 25357 (1995); see also 
Simpson, supra note 14, at 9. 
 193 Jane Alfred, Flagging Non-Paternity, 3 NATURE REV. GENETICS 161, 161 (2002). It is 
difficult to know whether this rate is accurate. The American Association of Blood Banks, the 
only organization in the US to collect information about relationship genetic testing from 
approved laboratories, suggests in its 2010 annual report (the latest available) that the average 
exclusion rate of paternal relationships is 20.44% with a standard deviation of 6.62. 
RELATIONSHIP TESTING PROGRAM UNIT, AABB, ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY FOR TESTING IN 
2010 3 (2010), available at http://www.aabb.org/sa/facilities/Documents/rtannrpt10.pdf. 
However, this percentage includes testing following a mother’s request to determine who 
among a few possible men is the father; it also includes testing after the recognized man raises 
a question of infidelity, after which a few other possible men are tested, leading the 
organization to conclude that “[t]here is no evidence that a large number of the men excluded 
in the testing were misled into believing they are the biological father of a given child.” Id. at 
4; See also Kermyt G. Anderson, How Well Does Paternity Confidence Match Actual 
Paternity? Evidence from Worldwide Paternity Rates, 47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 513, 515 
(2006); S. Macintyre & A. Sooman, Non-Paternity and Prenatal Genetic Screening, 338 
LANCET 869, 86970 (1991). 
 194 José Gabilondo, Heterosexuality as a Prenatal Social Problem: Why Parents and 
Courts Have a Taste for Heterosexuality, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS 
OF CREATING FAMILIES 118, 124, 129 n.43 (Michele B. Goodwin ed., 2010); Susan Golombok, 
et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies: Quality of Parenting and 
58 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 27:29 
 
 
case of posthumously conceived children, especially when the deceased has clearly 
provided consent. Thus, from a child’s perspective, judicial decisions denying 
parentage acknowledgement is the worst of all worlds. Such decisions lean on 
genetics, which is not as relevant for children and which would exclude 
posthumously conceived children born to non-traditional family structures from 
having an established parentage. Simultaneously, they do not take seriously 
children’s emphasis on the importance of their parentage relationships, which 
children construe as a matter of being planned and wanted.  
A more responsive approach would be to enable acknowledgment of the parental 
status of deceased spouses—even if such registration would not change the ensuing 
inheritance rights.
195
 Such acknowledgement is especially appropriate given that 
such children are likely to know their story of conception and to inquire, and hear 
about, their genetic parents.
196
 Indeed, studies on the process of grief and mourning 
suggest that in reality the dead continue to occupy a significant social and domestic 
space; in both traditional and Western societies, “the living continue to be in 
dialogical contact with the dead.”
197
 Parentage acknowledgement would also 
correspond better with states’ international obligations under international law. 
Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC explicitly require that regardless of status, a child is 
“registered immediately after birth, along with a right to a name and the right to 
preserve his or her identity, including name and family relations.
198
 Moreover, as the 
High Court in London declared in its judicial resolution of Ms. Blood’s second suit 
requesting parental registration, registering children born posthumously to a woman 
from the sperm of her deceased husband as fatherless, was contrary to the right to 
privacy and family life, as well as the right to found a family under Articles 8 and 12 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
199
 
Parental acknowledgement and registration will at least narrow the child’s familial 
dissonance. 
B.  Family Structures 
Another domain of legal argument over posthumously conceived children is 
family structure. Specifically, scholars and judicial opinions have argued that 
because a widow inherently acts out of sorrow and grief, she will not be able to 
                                                                                                                   
Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD DEV. 285, 297 (1995); Dena 
Moyal & Carolyn Shelly, Future Child’s Rights in New Reproductive Technology: Thinking 
Outside the Tube and Maintaining the Connections, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 431, 433 (2010); Zaira 
Papaligoura & Colwyn Trevarthen, Mother-Infant Communication Can be Enhanced after 
Conception by In-Vitro Fertilization, 22 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 591, 591 (2001). 
 195 See discussion infra Part IV(d). Yet, as argued below, I suggest that posthumously 
conceived children should be eligible also for the inheritance and social benefits. See 
discussion infra Part IV(d). 
 196 Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 46263. 
 197 Simpson, supra note 14, at 12; see also Ueda et al., supra note 53, at 29495 (discussing 
the support for posthumous conception among Japanese students because of “intimacy across 
the border between life and death” and the Japanese views on afterlife). 
 198 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 78. 
 199 See 25 Apr. 2001, PARL. DEB., H.C. Standing Committee G (2001) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/g/st010425/am/10425s01.htm. 
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provide a child with a stable and loving environment.
200
 They have also suggested 
that growing up with both parents is preferable to growing up in a single-parent 
household,
201
 not least because of possible financial hardship and the effects of 
poverty on the child’s development.
202
 Others have further stressed the negative 
psychological impact that such a non-traditional conception story might have on a 
child (as has been documented with children who were orphaned before knowing 
their parent) and charge that it is simply wrong to bring into the world a parent-less 
child.
203
 
Although these arguments seemingly aim to advance children’s interests, caution 
is needed. First, from a legal standpoint, the presumption of a universal, ultimate 
family structure for the child cannot hold. While the CRC pays great attention to the 
importance of the familial environment to the child, it does not limit the definition of 
the family to the traditional structure of a mother and a father.
204
 Rather, it allows 
for pluralism in family relations, requiring states to “respect the responsibilities, 
rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family 
or community . . . .”
205
 Second, worry over possible financial hardship cannot justify 
an automatic dismissal of requests for posthumous conception. At least some single 
parents can certainly provide a comfortable economic environment for the child,
206
 
and the practice of relying on assistance (financial and other) from extended family 
varies across cultures. In contrast to American and German individualist cultures, 
                                                 
 200 Sorin Hostiuc & Christian George Curca, Informed Consent in Posthumous Sperm 
Procurement, 282 ARCHIVES GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 433, 436 (2010); Hunfeld et al., 
supra note 28, at 284; Katz, supra note 13, at 30910; see also MAW v W. Sydney Area Health 
Serv. [2000] NSWC 358; 49 NSWLR 231 (Austl.); In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390, ¶ 
23 (Austl.); supra Part III. 
 201 See Takamatsu Kōtō Saibansho [Takamatsu High Court] July 16, 2004, Case to Seek 
Acknowledgement, 2004 (Ju) No. 1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÜ [MINSHÜ] 7 
(Japan). 
 202 Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, Children Raised in Fatherless Families from 
Infancy: A Follow-up of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers at Early 
Adolescence, 48 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1407, 1407 (2004); Williams, supra note 
153, at 195. 
 203 Ruth Landau, Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or 
IVF in Israel: An Ethical and Psychological Critique, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1952, 1953 (2004); 
Hostiuc & Curca, supra note 200, at 436; Antall, supra note 29, at 22021. See also Case to 
Seek Acknowledgement, 60 MINSHÜ 7.  
 204 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at pmbl., Arts. 23, 5, 710, 14, 
16, 18, 2023; Sabatello, supra note 30, at 82; see also Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 
2030 (2012); Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 464 (making a similar point). 
 205 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at Art. 5. 
 206 Given the expenses associated with assisted reproductive technologies in the US and 
Japan (unlike some other countries where such services are provided by the national 
healthcare system), it is also likely that low-income women will not have access to such 
procedures. Mayeda, supra note 55, at 15; Williams, supra note 153, at 195; see also From 
Sorrow to Surrogacy, supra note 53; Pulya, supra note 53. The children born to the 
grandmother who used her son’s sperm through two surrogates were cared for by the 
grandmother, her sister and a nanny. Pulya, supra note 53. 
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Israeli society, for instance, sees none of the family members as truly independent. 
The child and the future child are seen as part of a collective whole, characterized by 
mutual dependence and with duties and responsibilities towards one another.
207
 
Similarly, in cases where a child’s father dies young, Iran’s civil law transfers the 
responsibility for the child to the grandfather or uncle,
208
 suggesting that the 
extended family is invested in each child. Moreover, familial circumstances and 
subsequent financial improvement or hardship may occur in all kinds of families. 
For instance, divorcing parents (especially mothers) often experience a drop in 
financial stability and resources.
209
 By the same token, a surviving parent may well 
develop a new, more profitable, career path, or find another life partner—scenarios 
that are likely to improve the financial situation of the family unit. Discerning 
beforehand what the economic environment will be is thus often mere guesswork. 
Besides, as Justice Alon stated in NFO, many children are born into difficult 
conditions even when they have a traditional family structure, and the resolution of 
such instances should be to provide assistance and support rather than prohibit 
procreation.
210
 
Finally, and again, courts must bear in mind that children have valid perspectives 
on family structures. Studies with children consistently show that the child’s 
development is not negatively affected by a particular family structure—whether it is 
traditional, single parent, or same-sex household.
211
 Simultaneously, children of 
divorcing or separated parents show poorer psychological adjustment and higher 
incidents of behavioral problems and coping with transition to adulthood than 
children whose fathers have died.
212
 Children further do not view their family 
structure as wronging them in any way,
213
 and in fact, children have shown to be 
quite creative in their approach to kinship. Unlike adults who often frame familial 
structures as right or wrong, good or bad, children are particularly adept at 
developing strategies to comprehend complex family relationships.
214
 Moreover, 
children’s creativity has the potential to open up adult understanding of family forms 
                                                 
 207 Yael Hashiloni-Dolev & Shiri Shkedi, On New Reproductive Technologies and Family 
Ethics: Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis for Sibling Donor in Israel and Germany, 65 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 2081, 2087 (2007) (discussing differences between Israeli and German 
societies); see also Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, The Politics of ‘The Natural Family’ in 
Israel: State Policy and Kinship Ideologies, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1018, 1019 (2009). 
 208 Reza Omani Samani et al., Posthumous Assisted Reproduction from Islamic 
Perspective, 2 INT’L J. FERTILITY & STERILITY 96, 98 (2008). Whether an embryo or a pre-
implantation embryo is considered a child is beyond the scope of this essay.  
 209 MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 202, at 1407. 
 210 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) ¶ 5.2 
(Isr ). 
 211 Sozos J. Fasouliotis & Joseph G. Schenker, Social Aspects in Assisted Reproduction, 5 
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 26, 28 (1999). 
 212 MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 202, at 1047; see also Pobjoy, supra note 6, at 
465, 467 (discussing whether two parents are better than one). 
 213 Moyal & Shelley, supra note 194, at 436. 
 214 Jennifer Mason & Becky Tipper, Being Related: How Children Define and Create 
Kinship, 15 CHILDHOOD 441, 441 (2008). 
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where existing kinship vocabulary is inadequate.
215
 Thus, if we are concerned about 
the welfare and best interests of posthumously conceived children, further emphasis 
should be on what is most important for them—as it is for all other children—that is, 
that they enjoy loving and caring familial relationships.  
C. Identity Harm 
A third argument commonly raised in court cases on posthumously conceived 
children concerns identity. Notwithstanding provisions in the CRC requiring states 
to preserve the identity of a child (Article 8), some courts have suggested that a 
posthumously conceived child is likely to experience identity dilemmas due to the 
expectation that he or she take the place of the deceased parent and serve as the 
deceased’s “memorial candle.”
216
  
Certainly, there is something to this argument. In the MAW case, Justice O’Keefe 
expressed deep concern over the applicant’s statement in her affidavit that “I feel 
that I can’t live without my husband and this [harvesting his sperm] is giving me the 
opportunity to have at least part of him still with me.”
217
 This concern is especially 
valid when parents of the deceased are the ones to pursue the harvesting of gametes 
and their use. The mother of a man, who died in military service and who requested 
the posthumous harvesting of his sperm for the purpose of having a grandchild, 
expressed to an interviewer her sense of tragedy upon his death that he would be 
buried and nothing of him would be left to her.
218
 She was quoted stating,  
 
Just as I am my parents’ roots, he [the deceased] is mine. With all his 
beauty—both externally and internally—and with all his good genes . . . 
[and given that I have his sperm], people expect that I destroy the 
potential of having a grandchild from my son? Sperm is life, it gives life, 
it is the origin for a whole person.
219
  
 
Similarly, the Russian grandmother whose grandchild the authorities requested 
sending to an orphanage said, “Gosha [the grandchild] is a perfect copy of my [dead] 
son. Now I face losing it all again.”
220
 
But, whether this arguable harm justifies a prohibition is questionable. 
Procreation is often regarded as a natural desire to “continue the family line” and a 
desire to leave a piece of oneself behind. As Rebecca Collins points out, 
reproduction provides “philosophical or even spiritual comfort to them to know that 
a part of them will continue to live on, that somehow they will be able to ‘beat’ 
                                                 
 215 Id. 
 216 Ruth Landau, Planned Orphanhood, 49 SOC. SCI. & MED. 185, 188 (1999). 
 217 MAW v W. Sydney Area Health Serv. [2000] NSWSC 358; 49 NSWLR 231, ¶¶ 20, 22 
(Austl.). 
 218 Eti Abramov, I Will Fight Until I have a Grandchild from my Dead Son, YEDIOT 
AHARONOT, February 8, 2013 (translated from Hebrew).  
 219 Id. 
 220 Leidig, supra note 20, at 627. 
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death.”
221
 Parental expectation that a child will internalize and reflect pieces of 
oneself is therefore not in and of itself unique to posthumous conception. Moreover, 
while identity is increasingly recognized in legal discourses,
222
 a suggestion that 
certain kinds of procreation should be prohibited on the basis of “identity harm” 
raise the question: which identities should be protected—or avoided?  
Arguments about the harm to one’s identity have been raised in discussing other 
assisted reproductive technologies. These include genetic selection against or for 
disability, sex selection (commonly on the basis of son preference), and savior 
sibling scenario in which doctors attempt to select for implantation in the woman’s 
womb a pre-embryo whose genetic tissue composition matches the one of an 
existing sick sibling for the purpose of being a cell donor. The common thread 
among these scenarios is the suggestion that by so selecting, a parent or doctor 
imposes an identity on a child—whether it is a disability-related identity, a fixated 
gender-identity, or a donor-identity which is arguably characterized by anxiety, 
lesser sense of worth, and living in the shadow of the ill sibling, regardless of his or 
her other characteristics and interests.
223
 Scholars and courts have also considered 
concerns about the harm to children’s identity in gamete donation, where the identity 
of the donor is unknown.
224
 In this regard, scholars have drawn on accounts of the 
experiences of identity bewilderment among adopted children separated from their 
                                                 
 221 Rebecca Collins, Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in 
Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 431, 435 (2005). 
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Treaties/Html/164.htm [hereinafter Oviedo Convention]; Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin art. 1, opened for signature Jan. 24, 2002, E.T.S. No. 186 (entered 
into force May 1, 2006), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/186.htm; 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Concerning 
Biomedical Research art. 1, opened for signature Jan. 25, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 195 (entered 
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the Moral Significance of Why We Have Children, 23 BIOETHICS 291, 296 (2009). 
 224 See 13530/08 Family Court (Krayot), New Family Org. v. Rambam Med. Ctr. (2009) 
(Isr.); see also X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143 
(1997). The ECHR denied the joint request of a social family comprised of a biological 
mother, a female-to-male transgender father, and an anonymous donor-IVF child that the 
(new) man be registered as the father of the child inter alia on the basis of the lack of 
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biological parents, concluding that donor-conceived children will have similar 
experiences.
225
  
These are important concerns and they should be taken seriously, especially with 
respect to adopted children where there is mounting evidence as to their sense of 
loss. However, a few points should be highlighted. The first one is that all identities 
are complex and evolving. They are also not fixed. Multiple factors—family 
relations, peers, one’s socio-cultural milieu as well as general environment—play an 
even greater role than genetics in the formation of a child’s (and adult’s) identity.
226
 
Studies with children further show that, they have fluid and plural identities, and 
regardless of family structure—traditional, single parent or same-sex families—their 
process of identity formation is similar.
227
 Conversely, children’s identity 
construction is significantly influenced by an exclusionary social attitude which sets 
them apart. That is, societal attitudes that children with disabilities, girls, adopted 
children, or father-absent families are different—not genetics—would influence 
them the most.
228
 Thus, if we are concerned about the identity of posthumously 
conceived children, the focus should be on how to create an inclusive society, where 
such children enjoy equal rights, rather than singling them out as a “new special 
category” of children or dismissing them as parentless or without identity at all.
229
 
D. Inheritance and Social Benefits 
A final argument over posthumously conceived children is whether they should 
be eligible for inheritance and social benefits. As mentioned earlier, this concern has 
been debated especially in the United States
230
—an unsurprising result of the fact 
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that all cases concerning posthumous conception in the country, including the 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Capato case, revolved around these issues. A 
comprehensive discussion about them is beyond the scope of this essay. However, 
three brief points are salient.  
First, as courts commonly note, the state has a legitimate interest in the orderly 
administration of estates. This interest is further increasingly complex given that 
many parties may be legitimate beneficiaries of the estate, not least because of the 
changes in family structures including, as the Woodward Court points out, “serial 
marriages, serial families, and blended families.”
231
 Yet, an automatic exclusion of 
posthumously conceived children from inheritance cannot hold, and it is possible to 
create a more inclusive scheme for the distribution of such assets. As the Manitoba 
Law Reform Commission in Canada correctly expressed with respect to inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children, the values of inclusion outweigh the 
value of “administrative convenience, simplicity and efficiency.”
232
 Given that it is 
recommended that a recently widowed individual wait to proceed with fertility 
treatment until a certain grieving period has passed,
233
 it should be possible to 
extend the time period for inheritance rights beyond the traditional three hundred day 
period.
234
 The time extension should also take into account that pregnancy may not 
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immediately be achieved.
235
 Indeed, as the Woodward court points out, “the one-
year limitations period . . . may pose significant burdens on the surviving parent, and 
consequently on the child.”
236
 Thus, while such a scheme may be a more complex 
process—and may require a case-by-case determination rather than a universal 
standard—it will be more responsive to the interests of all involved.  
Second, in discussing whether a posthumously conceived child is entitled to 
social security benefits, courts have commonly examined whether the child falls 
within the scope of a “child” for the purpose of the Social Security Act and whether 
the child is a “dependent” on the deceased.
237
 Both criteria have often been 
answered negatively: the first, because the biological tie was necessary but 
insufficient for the determination of parent-child relationship and as death ends the 
marital status as well as the presumption of a “marital child”;
238
 the second, because 
the posthumously conceived child could not, practically, enjoy the benefits of his 
deceased parent’s support during the lifetime of the parent.
239
 In practice, however, 
as both the Woodward and Gillett-Netting courts emphasized, neither of these 
criteria are set in stone. The marital requirement is not essential when recognizing 
parentage,
240
 and all children are dependent.
241
 Moreover, given that the deceased’s 
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consent for posthumous conception is required (whether by law
242
 or medical 
practice)
243
 and that child’s social security benefits are based on the deceased’s 
earnings during his or her lifetime, the primary beneficiary of excluding 
posthumously conceived children is the governmental insurance fund responsible for 
the distribution of payments.
244
 This cannot be an acceptable—and is certainly not 
the only possible—solution. 
Finally, in most instances, both inheritance and social security benefits are 
unlikely to be unbearably complex or burdensome. With respect to inheritance, the 
life-partner of the deceased or his or her parents are those who commonly inherit 
from the deceased. And especially when the extended family supports the 
posthumous conception, they clearly also express their interest that the resulting 
child continues the ‘family line” including by inheritance. The legal acceptance of 
such arrangements should thus not stand in the way of the child. Similarly, with 
respect to social security benefits, although the number of requests for posthumous 
conception has increased,
245
 the number of children born as a result is overall very 
low.
246
 It is also unlikely to become a prevalent or preferable way for procreation. 
There is therefore no risk that extending it to all posthumously conceived children 
will deplete external sources. Indeed, generosity would be the just response.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the issue of posthumously conceived children has received much media 
and popular attention in the past few years, a conversation about the welfare and best 
interests of posthumously conceived children has been suspiciously missing from the 
discourse. As I have shown, this neglect has extended to judicial decisions on this 
issue. However, given that the phenomenon of posthumously conceived children is 
not likely to disappear anytime soon —indeed, it is likely to increase—it is important 
that we recapture the conversation. Including children’s perspectives either through 
research with posthumously conceived children themselves if they are already 
sufficiently old or from studies with children in seemingly comparable cases is 
essential. Ultimately, posthumously conceived children place the utmost importance 
on the relationships around them, both real and abstract; the adults helping to resolve 
their dilemmas should take a more relational approach to their welfare and best 
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interests. This is also the only way that all children, including posthumously 
conceived children, will have a fair and equal chance in life. 
 
 
 
